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Abstract
One of the primary concerns of users of cloud-based ser-
vices and applications is the risk of unauthorized access
to their private information. For the common setting in
which the infrastructure provider and the online service
provider are different, end users have to trust their data
to both parties, although they interact solely with the ser-
vice provider. This paper presents CloudFence, a frame-
work that allows users to independently audit the treat-
ment of their private data by third-party online services,
through the intervention of the cloud provider that hosts
these services.
CloudFence is based on a fine-grained data flow track-
ing platform exposed by the cloud provider to both de-
velopers of cloud-based applications, as well as their
users. Besides data auditing for end users, CloudFence
allows service providers to confine the use of sensitive
data in well-defined domains using data tracking at ar-
bitrary granularity, offering additional protection against
inadvertent leaks and unauthorized access. The results
of our experimental evaluation with real-world applica-
tions, including an e-store platform and a cloud-based
backup service, demonstrate that CloudFence requires
just a few changes to existing application code, while it
can detect and prevent a wide range of security breaches,
ranging from data leakage attacks using SQL injection,
to personal data disclosure due to missing or erroneously
implemented access control checks.
1 Introduction
The multifaceted benefits of cloud computing to both ser-
vice providers and end users have led to its rapid adop-
tion for the deployment of online services and applica-
tions. As businesses and individuals increasingly rely
on the cloud, some of their private data is being han-
dled and stored on systems outside of their administra-
tive control. In this setting, data confidentiality becomes
a growing concern, especially when taking into account
the recent spate of security breaches in major online ser-
vices [39, 13, 42]. In lack of an alternative option other
than not using the service at all, most users eventually
trust the service provider for keeping their data safe.
Unfortunately, relying solely on reputable service
providers or highly popular services does not mitigate
the risk. Most feature-rich cloud-based services are quite
complex, and are usually based on the integration of a
multitude of existing components, such as web servers,
databases, and other software modules. Bugs and vulner-
abilities in third-party code, misconfigurations and incor-
rect assumptions about the interaction between different
components, or even simple causes like the careless han-
dling of access credentials, can lead to the accidental ex-
posure of critical data, or leave the system vulnerable to
data theft attacks. At the same time, cloud computing
encourages rapid application deployment, and time-to-
market pressure sometimes makes data security a sec-
ondary priority.
Despite the existence of a large body of work on data
leakage prevention, detection, and mitigation [23, 51, 49,
19], data breaches still pose an important threat. In this
work, we seek to reinforce the confidence of end users
for the safety of their data, beyond any assurances offered
by the online service. To this end, we propose to give
users the ability to audit their cloud-resident data through
a different—and potentially more trustful—entity than
the actual provider of the service. This can be achieved
by taking advantage of the multi-party trust relationships
that exist in typical cloud environments [10], in which
the service provider is different than the provider of the
infrastructure on which the service is hosted.
As a step towards this goal, in this paper we present
CloudFence, a data flow tracking (DFT) framework for
cloud-based applications. CloudFence is offered by
cloud hosting providers as a service to their tenants, as
well as to the users of the tenants’ services. Through a
simple API, service providers can easily integrate data
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flow tracking in their services, and mark sensitive user
data that needs to be protected. End users can then mon-
itor the propagation of their data directly through the
cloud hosting provider, ensure that all sensitive data is
treated as expected, and spot any deviations. Service
providers can also take advantage of data flow tracking
for enabling an additional layer of protection against data
leaks, by preventing the propagation of marked data be-
yond a set of specified network and file system locations.
We have implemented CloudFence on top of a fine-
grained data flow tracking library based on runtime bi-
nary instrumentation. CloudFence is dynamically at-
tached to the processes that comprise a cloud applica-
tion, such as web servers and databases, including pro-
cesses that run on different physical or virtual hosts.
Cross-application and cross-host tag propagation is han-
dled transparently, without requiring any modifications
to application code.
In our current prototype, service providers are respon-
sible for specifying the sources of sensitive data and as-
sociating them with each user, as well as for defining the
allowed data flow paths and confinement points. This
means that we consider service providers as trusted, and
willing to integrate CloudFence into their applications, as
well as to cooperate with the cloud provider for providing
an added-value service to their users. However, integrat-
ing CloudFence in a more strict cloud environment, such
as Google App Engine, which exposes to developers only
well-defined APIs for building their applications, would
allow for robust data flow tracking and auditing even in
the presence of a malicious service provider.
We evaluated the effectiveness and performance of
CloudFence using three real-world applications, and two
publicly disclosed data leakage vulnerabilities in two of
these applications. CloudFence can be easily integrated
in these applications, since it requires the placement of
just a few API calls in each case, while it offers effec-
tive protection against a wide range of data theft attacks,
including SQL injection and arbitrary file read attacks.
The runtime overhead due to dynamic instrumentation
in an e-commerce application imposes an average slow-
down that ranges between 60–90%, for an intensive sce-
nario with a hundred concurrent clients. Although sig-
nificant, this overhead is amplified by the dynamic code
generation behavior of PHP, which hinders the effective
caching of instrumented code blocks, and can be amelio-
rated using PHP bytecode caching techniques. Still, even
under these worst-case conditions, CloudFence remains
a practical solution for real-world services.
2 Approach
Users of online services trust the providers of those ser-
vices to securely handle and protect their personal infor-
Figure 1: CloudFence allows users to directly audit
their cloud-resident data independently through the cloud
hosting provider.
mation. Access credentials, credit card and social secu-
rity numbers, documents, and other kinds of sensitive
data are temporarily or permanently stored in back-end
databases and file systems, out of user control. Even
when service providers are considered trusted and follow
best security practices, unauthorized access to sensitive
data remains a plausible threat, e.g., due to vulnerabili-
ties in third-party software components that are part of
the service.
For cloud-based applications, service providers in turn
place their trust in the cloud infrastructure that hosts their
online services. The traditional provider-user relation-
ship is thus transformed into a multi-party system [10],
in which end users are usually not aware at all of the ex-
istence of the cloud infrastructure provider (unless it is
the same entity that also offers the service to end users,
as for example is the case with many of the web appli-
cations offered by Google or Amazon). In this work
we refer to both infrastructure and platform “as a ser-
vice” (IaaS/PaaS) providers as cloud providers. Their in-
frastructure hosts the applications of service providers,
which are delivered as services to end users.
From the users’ perspective, there is an inherent
shared responsibility between the cloud and the service
providers regarding the security guarantees of the pro-
vided service. Despite the fact that end users do not
interact directly with the cloud provider, they implicitly
trust its infrastructure—the systems in which their data
are kept. CloudFence aims to promote and expose this
implicit trust for the benefit of all parties, by introduc-
ing a direct relationship between end users and the cloud
provider, as illustrated in Figure 1.
With data flow tracking as the basic underlying mech-
anism, the cloud provider offers end users the ability of
data auditing, allowing them to inspect the audit trail of
any sensitive data that was handled as part of a service
hosted on the cloud provider’s infrastructure. While the
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trust relationship between users and service providers is
not altered, users get an elevated degree of confidence
by being able to independently monitor their private in-
formation as it propagates through the cloud. In fact,
users are likely to be more willing to trust a large, well
known, and highly reputable cloud provider, compared
to a lesser-known developer or company, e.g., among
the thousands that offer their applications and services
through online application distribution platforms.
At the same time, service providers themselves can
take advantage of data flow tracking to confine the use
of sensitive user data in well-defined network and file
system domains, and thus prevent inadvertent leaks or
unauthorized data access. Besides protecting user data, a
service provider can also take advantage of CloudFence
as an additional level of protection for its own digital as-
sets, such as back-end credentials, source code, or con-
figuration files.
Finally, by integrating CloudFence in its infrastruc-
ture, the cloud provider offers added value to its tenants
and their users, which can potentially lead to a larger
customer base. Given the shared responsibility between
cloud and service providers regarding the safety of user
data, both have an extra incentive to adopt CloudFence
as a means of providing an additional level of assurance
to their customers.
Threat Model. We assume that service providers are
trusted, and integrate CloudFence in their applications
to enhance the security of the provided services. This
is a typical situation for cloud-based services, since end
users always implicitly trust their data to both the service
provider and the cloud hosting provider.
Our current implementation is built on top of a user-
level data flow tracking system based on runtime bi-
nary instrumentation, which is directly integrated into the
components of the protected service through an API pro-
vided by the cloud provider. Application developers are
responsible for specifying the sources of sensitive user
input, so that all necessary data is always being marked
and tracked appropriately.
Data flow tracking at user-level means that an attacker
that gains arbitrary code execution can bypass data track-
ing and exfiltrate sensitive information without being
logged. However, our prototype offers protection against
many other classes of attacks that can lead to unautho-
rized data access, but which do not allow arbitrary code
execution. Such attacks include SQL injection, com-
mand injection, parameter tampering, directory traversal,
and other attacks that are widely seen in the wild. Note
that this is a limitation of our current prototype and not
of the CloudFence framework in general. An alternative
implementation using data flow tracking at the hypervi-
sor level [50] would allow for accurate data tracking even
in the case of a fully compromised guest OS. We discuss
this issue further in Section 6.
Besides providing protection against external attacks,
an equally important goal of CloudFence is to bring into
users’ attention any unintended data exposure that can
lead to unauthorized access. For example, sensitive in-
formation can accidentally be recorded in an error log,
or be included into a debug memory dump after an appli-
cation crash.
3 Design
Cloud computing is a paradigm with unique security
and privacy aspects. Its key characteristics [41], such
as on-demand self-service, ubiquitous network access,
and location-independent resource pooling, result into
a perimeter-less environment, which poses significant
challenges for protecting against unauthorized access to
sensitive data.
Instead of trying to fortify the software that oper-
ates on private user information [45], or striving to en-
force data and network isolation [27], CloudFence adopts
a data-centric security approach for the cloud setting,
by exploiting the implicit trust relationships that exist
in cloud computing environments. Specifically, Cloud-
Fence builds upon the observation that sensitive data is
the valuable aspect that needs to be protected. By pro-
viding auditing capabilities at an extremely fine-grained
granularity (down to the byte level) and across the whole
cloud infrastructure, CloudFence can alert users for con-
fidentiality breaches and information leaks. In the rest
of this section, we describe the challenges for integrating
data flow tracking into cloud infrastructures, and present
a design that addresses these challenges.
3.1 Data Flow Tracking as a Service
Integrating data flow tracking capabilities in a cloud en-
vironment is not a trivial task, since many issues have to
be taken into consideration. First, the on-demand consol-
idation of computing elements, which alleviates the costs
of over-provisioning via elastic scaling [10], allows ser-
vice providers to easily “glue” together functionality and
content from third-party sources, to build feature-rich ap-
plications. For instance, the term mashup is colloquially
used to refer to web application hybrids that combine
services—from potentially untrusted principals—to of-
fer “rich web experience.” 1 The benefits of such an ag-
ile development and service provisioning approach are
numerous, and therefore, it is critical not to interfere
1“Given a choice between dancing pigs and security, users will pick
dancing pigs every time.” – Edward Felten & Gary McGraw.
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Figure 2: CloudFence architecture.
with that paradigm while enabling sensitive data track-
ing. We consider this as the transparent tracking re-
quirement. The proposed method for data flow tracking
should not require intrusive changes, such as manually
annotating source code [33] or using custom OSs [48]
and modified hypervisors [50], to facilitate incremental
deployment and expeditious adoption.
Second, the granularity at which sensitive informa-
tion is tracked throughout the cloud infrastructure, plays
a crucial role in the effectiveness of DFT. Particularly,
a service provider can trace data as small as a single
byte [30] and provide robust protection against extreme
cases of data leakage, or assume a more coarse-grained,
and hence error-prone, approach [27]. However, ex-
tremely fine-grained DFT comes at a significant perfor-
mance cost, as tracking logic becomes more intricate
(e.g., consider the case of two 32-bit numbers that have
only some of their bits marked as sensitive). We consider
this as the fine-grained tracking requirement, which sug-
gests performing DFT at the appropriate granularity for
balancing overhead and accuracy. The scale of choice
should be pertinent and without false positive outcomes,
even in situations where multi-principal data are fed into
a composite application.
Third, given the range of cloud delivery mechanisms
with different compositional characteristics (e.g., IaaS,
PaaS), it is important to ensure that dynamic collabora-
tion is taken into consideration when performing DFT.
The domain-wide tracking requirement refers to the pre-
cise monitoring of data flows that result from on-demand
synthesis, and take place during the transient interac-
tions among application components. In particular, the
DFT method should be able to accurately track sensitive
data that are delivered to application modules beyond the
process boundary. Examples include intra-host applica-
tion elements that communicate through the file system
or OS-level IPC, or consolidated application components
running on remote endpoints.
3.2 Architecture Overview
The design of CloudFence addresses the challenges pre-
sented in the previous section, while providing fine-
grained auditing capabilities for cloud-based services.
Note that for the rest of our discussion, we assume that
the service provider relies on an IaaS delivery mech-
anism, which represents an extreme case of data flow
tracking complexity. However, CloudFence is by no
means limited only to this setting, and can be seamlessly
employed in PaaS and SaaS setups.
CloudFence consists of two main components, which
we summarize below and describe in detail in the follow-
ing sections.
• DFT The data flow tracking component is the nu-
cleus of CloudFence, and an essential part of our ar-
chitecture. It performs fine-grained, byte-level data
flow tracking without requiring any modification
to applications or the underlying OS. Briefly, our
DFT component is application agnostic; it uses dy-
namic binary instrumentation (DBI) for retrofitting
the data flow tracking logic into unmodified bina-
ries dynamically, at runtime, and supports track-
ing across processes running on the same or remote
hosts. It piggybacks tags on the data exchanged
through IPC mechanisms or network I/O chan-
nels, and transparently handles (un)marshalling,
and keeps persistent tag information for marked
data written to files.
• API Stub The CloudFence API allows service
providers to tag (i.e., attach metadata information)
on sensitive user data that enters their applications.
Note that CloudFence does not require application
modifications as far as data tracking is concerned
(this is handled transparently by DFT). However, it
requires slight changes to application code for la-
beling any sensitive information.
Figure 2 illustrates the architecture of CloudFence.
The two processes in the upper part of the figure repre-
sent components of a consolidated application, while the
rest of the components are part of the cloud provider’s
infrastructure. Recall that we assume an IaaS delivery
mechanism, and this particular example both processes
run on the same (virtual) host.
The DFT component is attached to all processes of a
composite application, acting as a reference monitor [5]
that, loosely stated, tracks every byte transfer in the pro-
cess memory, as well as between the process and the
OS. The API stub is used directly by the processes to
tag sensitive data and convey to CloudFence which byte
sequences correspond to chunks of sensitive information.
Data that are tagged as sensitive (denoted by the solid
line in the figure) are tracked across all local files, host-
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Figure 3: Main interactions among the different parties
involved in the use of CloudFence-enabled services.
wide IPC mechanisms, and selected network sockets.
Tagged bytes that pass through I/O channels and are writ-
ten to a cloud storage device, or are transmitted to a re-
mote host via the network, result into an audit message
(denoted by the dashed line). Audit information is kept
into data store located outside the vicinity of the service
provider, and more importantly, operates in an “append-
only” fashion for preventing tampering with archived au-
dit trails. The audit messages sent by the DFT com-
ponent capture leakage events that result from writing
private information into files or remote endpoints, while
messages sent by the API stub are mostly for initiating
the audit process.
Putting it all together. Figure 3 depicts the main inter-
actions among the different parties that are involved in a
CloudFence-enabled service.
Initially, users aregister with the cloud provider
(1), and acquire a universally unique audit identifier
(UUAID). Then, they use the online services offered
by various service providers (hosted on the same cloud
provider) by providing the UUAID acquired from the
previous step (2). The actual mechanism used for con-
veying the UUAID of each user to CloudFence is not ad-
dressed in this work, and is left for future consideration.
As an example, the service provider can either request
from the users to provide their UUAID during the sign up
process with the corresponding application,2 or in case a
cloud-wide identity management system is in place (e.g.,
a single sign-on system like OpenID), the application can
access the respective UUID transparently by requesting
it directly from the cloud provider after the user has suc-
cessfully authenticated. Sensitive data is tagged by the
service provider with the supplied user UUAID, and is
tracked throughout the cloud infrastructure, while audit
information is gathered and stored at the cloud provider
2Special consideration needs to be taken in that case, so as to deal
with illegitimate users that supply UUAIDs that belong to others.
(3). At any time, users can monitor the audit trails of
their data directly through the cloud provider (4).
3.3 DFT Component
Data flow tracking is a well-researched area that builds
upon Denning’s seminal work on secure information
flow [16]. In the past, it has been mainly used for de-
tecting unauthorized data usage and enforcing safe infor-
mation flows, and thus, it is known as information flow
tracking [40] and information flow control [28].
3.3.1 Method Synopsis
Fundamentally, the DFT process is characterized by
three aspects that we summarize below.
• Data sources Data sources are entry points for in-
teresting data. Specifically, they are program or
memory locations at which data of concern enter a
system. Examples include functions, system calls,
and shared memory segments. Data originating
from a data source is tagged either entirely, or par-
tially based on an application-specific policy.
• Data tracking During the execution of a program,
tagged data are tracked and their tags get propagated
in accordance to the semantics of the executed in-
structions. For instance, whenever tagged data are
copied, modified, or combined, their respective tags
are accordingly propagated to the end result.
• Data sinks Data sinks are also program or mem-
ory locations where assertions can be made regard-
ing the presence of tagged data, for inspecting or
enforcing specific data flows. For example, tagged
data may not be allowed in certain memory pages
or function arguments.
From an operational perspective, DFT has two re-
quirements. First, it requires extra memory for keeping
the data tags of a program, and second, the program it-
self needs to be extended with tag propagation logic, as
well as data tagging and checking logic at data sources
and sinks. The code that implements this functionality
can be incorporated in source code with source-to-source
code transformation [45], retrofitted dynamically into
unmodified binaries using dynamic binary instrumenta-
tion (DBI) [31, 34], integrated into virtual machine mon-
itors (VMMs) [21] and full system emulators [11, 32, 7],
or implemented in hardware [40, 43].
3.3.2 libdft: A Fast and Reusable DFT Framework
for Commodity Systems
CloudFence is based on libdft, a homegrown frame-
work [24] in the form of a shared library, for seamless
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data flow tracking within a single process. The novel de-
sign of the library offers low performance overhead, ver-
satility, and practicality, and allows the development of
DFT-aware tools in an effortless manner, thus conform-
ing to the challenges presented earlier in Section 3.1.
At the same time, libdft performs fine-grained, dynamic
DFT without requiring any modification to applications
or the underlying OS, and transparently handles multi-
process and multithreaded programs.
The tracking process is performed dynamically by em-
ploying Intel’s Pin DBI tool [26]. Pin injects a tiny user-
level VMM inside already running processes, or in new
processes at startup, and provides an extensive API that
libdft uses for inspecting and modifying the process bi-
nary at the instruction level. Note that instrumenting at
the process level, and not at the hypervisor, has not only
performance benefits, but also alleviates any “semantic
gap” issues due to VMM introspection. In particular,
libdft uses Pin to analyze all instructions that move or
combine data for determining data dependencies. Then,
based on the discovered dependencies, it instruments the
program code by injecting the respective tag propagation
logic before the corresponding instructions. Both the
original and the additional instrumentation code are re-
translated using Pin’s just-in-time compiler, to generate
the DFT-enabled code that will actually run. However,
this process is performed only once, right before execut-
ing a previously unseen sequence of instructions, and the
instrumented code is placed into a code cache to avoid
paying the translation cost multiple times.
3.4 CloudFence API
The API of CloudFence consists of three calls with the
following C prototypes:
int /* success/failure */
add_tag(const void *buf, /* starting address */
size_t len, /* length */
const char *label) /* label (byte tag) */
int /* success/failure */
del_tag(const void *buf, /* starting address */
size_t len) /* length */
int /* success/failure */
copy_tag(const void *dst, /* destination address */
const void *src, /* source address */
size_t len) /* length */
The add tag function is used by service providers for
tagging, i.e., associating a byte label, to every byte in the
address range [&buf, &buf + len], while del tag is
used for removing previous associations and unlabel-
ing data. The copy tag function is similar to libc’s
memcpy, but instead of copying data, it propagates the tag
information maintained by libdft for the data in [&src,
&src + len] to [&dst, &dst + len]. The function-
ality is necessary for aiding the service provider in deal-
ing with cases of unintended unlabeling, also known as
whitewashing. We further discuss this issue in Section 6.
To support higher level languages, which are com-
monly used in web applications, appropriate wrappers
can easily be implemented. Specifically, for some of the
applications used in our evaluation, we developed a PHP
extension that gets two string arguments (other types can
be supported likewise) and internally calls the low-level
C functions exported by the CloudFence API.
4 Implementation
In this section, we describe the implementation details
of the components that comprise CloudFence. From a
high-level view, most of CloudFence’s functionality is
built on top of libdft, except for the CloudFence user in-
terface, which is a web application coupled with a back-
end database that users can use for auditing their data.
Specifically, we used libdft v3.14, which, as men-
tioned in Section 3.3.2, provides support for transparent
tag propagation and an API for assigning and manipulat-
ing tags on memory-resident data, as well as for hooking
system calls or library functions. The current implemen-
tation of libdft performs byte-level data flow tracking,
and stores the tag for each data byte in shadow byte—
allowing support for eight different tag values per byte
(further discussed in Section 6).
4.1 Data Tag Propagation and Persistence
Currently, libdft supports tag propagation within the
memory space of a single process, and does not handle
the case of data written to files or network sockets. How-
ever, to allow for accurate data flow tracking throughout
a whole cloud-based application, CloudFence requires
persistent data tags, as well as tag propagation across dif-
ferent processes, which may run on different (physical or
virtual) hosts (see the domain-wide tracking requirement
in Section 3.1). To this end, we have built a layer on top
of libdft to support tag propagation across BSD sockets,
Unix pipes, files, and shared memory.
4.1.1 BSD Sockets and Unix Pipes
Exchange of tag information over sockets and pipes is
handled by embedding all relevant data tags along with
the actual data that is being transferred. Maintaining the
tag propagation logic completely transparent to existing
applications, without modifying them or breaking the se-
mantics of their communication, is the most challenging
part of this effort.
In our current prototype, the exchanged tag informa-
tion consists of a copy of the relevant area of the shadow
memory that libdft maintains for the transmitted data.
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Consequently, the size of each transmitted message dou-
bles, along with the addition of four bytes, which hold
the size of the embedded shadow memory copy. Com-
pressed forms of the tag information could also be used
to reduce the data overhead, while slightly increasing the
computational overhead.
Synchronous I/O. For synchronous I/O, the approach
we followed was to hook the write, send, and writev
system calls, using libdft’s syscall hooking API, and
transmit the tag information before the actual data of the
original system call. For send and write, the additional
tag data consist of a copy of the shadow memory area
corresponding to the original buffer, along with its four-
byte size value. In order to avoid any additional copy-
ing of the shadow memory regions in writev, we cre-
ate a shallow copy of the vector structure and just up-
date its pointers to the shadow memory parts of the orig-
inal buffers. The total length of the shadow vector along
with the vector itself are prepended again in the writev
syscall. Similarly, we hook the read, recv, and readv
system calls, and read the tag information before the ac-
tual data.
Extra care is taken in case the size of the messages sent
is different than the size of the receive buffer—which was
often the case during our evaluation. More precisely, ev-
ery message sent can be received (i) at once, (ii) split
in multiple parts, or (iii) interleaved. In the first case,
the tag data and the original data are received inside the
same receiving operation and we simply have to attach
the tag data to the original data on the receiver. For mes-
sages that are received through more that one read op-
eration, the receiver initially buffers the tag information.
Each time a message part is received, its corresponding
tag information is attached to it, until the whole message
is received. The most difficult case we should handle
is when the send buffer size does not much the receive
one. For example, the sender transmits two 500-byte
messages back to back, and the receiver reads them using
a 200-byte buffer. In this case, the third read operation re-
ceives 100 bytes of the original data and 100 bytes of the
second message’s tag information. This case is handled
by changing the length argument of the read operation to
match the end of the current message.
Non-blocking I/O. In the case of non-blocking I/O, the
above system calls may return a special error code as if
the requested operation would block (EAGAIN). Keeping
the exchange of tag information transparent requires spe-
cial handling of this type of errors. Specifically, if such
an error occurs when trying to read the embedded tag
information, control returns immediately to the applica-
tion, as if its read operation failed. If some, but not all,
of the tag data is available, the available part is buffered
and CloudFence emulates a “would block” error, as if the
read operation would block. Similarly, for write opera-
tions, we keep accounting of the relevant shadow mem-
ory data that is actually sent, and emulate EAGAIN errors
until all relevant shadow data has been completely trans-
mitted.
The strategy followed for the write operations assumes
that the application always retries to send the same data
when it fails with a “would block” error. There are two
ways to relax this assumption though. First, trade safety
for performance by checking if the file descriptor is ready
to write and block until the tag data and the message is
sent. The other option is to check if the buffer’s address
or contents are changed between the failed write opera-
tions – requires copying the buffer –, cancel any part of
the tag data already sent and retransmit the ones that cor-
respond to the new buffer. We should note here that al-
though there were cases of non-blocking I/O in our eval-
uation, this assumption always held.
Multiplexed I/O. Regarding multiplexed I/O using the
select, poll, and epoll system calls, we chose to
trade a small performance overhead in favor of a safer
hooking implementation. Before each read or write op-
eration, we block until all tag information is received or
sent, similarly to the synchronous I/O scenario. A more
robust implementation would be to check if any of the
ready-to-read file descriptors are waiting to receive a new
message, and attempt to first retrieve its tag information.
In case only part of the information is available, we can
buffer it, and remove the file descriptor from the returned
set of select or poll, as if it was not ready to be read.
However, such an implementation could break applica-
tion semantics, since the actual intention of the applica-
tion after a select or poll invocation is not known in
advance, e.g., the application could use recvmsg, or not
read any data at all.
Finally, in some cases, non-blocking I/O can be com-
bined with multiplexed I/O—a case that we encountered
during our evaluation. For instance, this situation arises
when an application performs a connect system call on
a non-blocking socket descriptor, and then passes it on
as an argument to select or poll for monitoring its
completion. In that case, connect returns a special error
code (EINPROGRESS) and then the application monitors
when the socket descriptor is ready for writing, which
implicitly means that connect completed. The out-
come of connect can be checked using the getsockopt
system call. We handle this case by marking the file
descriptors for which connect returned EINPROGRESS,
and then searching for them in the ready-to-write sets of
poll or select. The post-connect system call hook is
then called for each file descriptor found.
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4.1.2 Files
Tag information should persist even when data is writ-
ten into files, so that these tags can be later retrieved
when the same or another process accesses the same file.
CloudFence supports persistent tagging of file data by
employing shadow files. Whenever a file is opened using
one of the open or creat system calls, we also create a
second shadow file in the same path, which has the name
of the original file appended with a special suffix. This
shadow file is mapped to memory and associated with
the original file descriptor.
Whenever a process writes to a file using the write,
writev, or pwrite system calls, the tag information of
the relevant buffer (or buffers, in case of writev) is also
written in the appropriate offset of the mapped shadow
file. Similarly, after a read operation from a file, us-
ing read, readv, or pread, the relevant tag information
from the corresponding shadow file is also represented at
the destination buffer. Finally, by monitoring all the read
and write operations on files, we maintain the size of the
shadow files in accordance with the originals.
4.1.3 Shared Memory
Another commonly used inter-process communication
mechanism that CloudFence supports, is shared memory.
Our current implementation supports shared memory re-
gions allocated using mmap, but it can be easily extended
to cover POSIX API calls (e.g., shm open) or SysV API
calls (e.g., shmget). CloudFence hooks calls to mmap,
and for each shared memory region, it creates a shadow
copy to hold libdft’s tag information.
The mmap function supports two ways to create a
shared memory region between two processes: anony-
mously, or by mapping the same file. In the first case, a
process creates an anonymous shared memory region and
then forks. The pointer to that region is then inherited by
the child processes, so we do not have to take any further
actions (i.e., the shadow copy is inherited as well). In
the second case, the two processes map the same file by
specifying the MAP SHARED flag. Again, another shared
memory region for keeping tag information is created,
but this time instead of being anonymous, it corresponds
to a special file. The path for this file is constructed in
the same way as described in the case of shadow files,
but with a different suffix.
4.2 Data Flow Domain
In CloudFence, data flow tracking is performed within
the boundaries of a well-defined data flow domain, ac-
cording to the components of the online service. Ser-
vice providers specify the set of programs and network
hosts that comprise the service, and data tags propa-
gate throughout all processes and inter-process channels.
Whenever some tagged data crosses through the defined
boundary, e.g., when a destination file or host does not
belong to the specified domain, CloudFence logs the ac-
tion in the audit database, and, depending on the config-
uration, may block it. As an example, the domain for
the bookmark synchronization application that we used
in our evaluation spans two processes: a web server and
a SQL server.
CloudFence dynamically instruments all relevant pro-
cesses by following any spawned child processes, and
by default enables tag propagation for any communica-
tion through sockets, pipes, or shared memory between
them. We should note that tag persistence in files and tag
propagation in shared memory is transparent and does
not affect processes in which CloudFence has not been
enabled, since tag information is separate from the ac-
tual data. On the other hand, tag propagation through
network sockets embeds tag information in par with the
transmitted data, and consequently both communicating
processes should be aware of that.
To automate the configuration of tag propagation be-
tween processes that exchange data through the network,
CloudFence maintains a global registry of active sock-
ets that support it. This is implemented by hooking the
connect and accept system calls of processes in the
same domain. Each time a connection is attempted, the
initiator’s address, e.g., 127.0.0.1:56443, is recorded
in a list of endpoints that support tag propagation. At
the same time, the other endpoint’s address is queried in
the list, and if it exists, this means that both endpoints
support it, and consequently tag propagation is enabled
for this connection. At the server side, upon a call to
accept, and before the call actually returns, the server’s
address is inserted in the list of sockets that support tag
propagation, if not already present. After accept re-
turns, the client’s address is queried in the list, and if
it exists, then tag propagation is enabled. Note that using
this process, service providers must only specify the pro-
cesses that comprise the cloud application, and then the
rest of the tag propagation logic is determined automati-
cally.
For the simple case in which the whole application is
deployed on a single (virtual) host, the registry is stored
in shared memory and can be accessed by all the Cloud-
Fence stubs. To support tag propagation across different
hosts, each host maintains a network-accessible registry
as part of the CloudFence stubs. When an instrumented
process connects to a remote host within the same do-
main, it first queries the destination host’s registry to de-
termine whether the server supports tag propagation, and
then proceeds accordingly.3
3Another implementation approach we explored was out-of-band
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4.3 CloudFence User Interface
For our prototype implementation, we developed a rudi-
mentary web interface through which users can browse
through the audit logs that have been generated for the
applications hosted on the cloud provider. Each appli-
cation pushes audit messages to this service that is also
accessible by end users. In addition, the interface pro-
vides simple user and UUIAD managment. Upon reg-
istration, users receive a newly generated UUIAD. This
can be later used during the registration in any Cloud-
Fence enabled service. In summary, this implementa-
tion of the CloudFence user interface follows the simple
model described in Section 3.2, in which users manually
convey the UUAID to each cloud application.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate CloudFence in terms of ease
of deployment in existing applications, runtime perfor-
mance, and effectiveness against data leakage attacks,
using three real-world applications: an e-commerce
framework, a network backup system, and a book-
mark synchronization service. Our experimental envi-
ronment consists of three servers, each equipped with
two 2.66GHz quad core Intel Xeon X5500 CPUs and
24GB of RAM, interconnected through a Gigabit switch.
To better match a cloud infrastructure environment, two
of the servers hosting the CloudFence-enabled applica-
tions were running VMWare ESXi v4.1, and all applica-
tions were installed in virtual machines. The third server
was used to simulate clients and drive the experiments,
and was running a 64-bit version of Debian 6. Finally,
the guest OS in all virtual machines was 32-bit Debian 6.
5.1 Deploying CloudFence
5.1.1 e-store
The first scenario we consider is an online store hosted
on a cloud-based infrastructure. Typically, during a pur-
chase transaction, sensitive information like the credit
card number and the recipient’s postal and email ad-
dress are transmitted to the online store, and from there,
usually to third-party payment processors. The service
provider can incorporate CloudFence in the e-store ap-
plication to allow users to monitor their sensitive data,
as well as to restrict the use of sensitive data within the
application’s domain.
(OOB) socket data, like urgent data in TCP. Although such an im-
plementation would have been more transparent, it could not be used
as OOB data interfere with normal data in the implementation of the
select syscall in Linux. The BSD implementation of the same syscall
does not have this issue.
The developers of the e-store know in advance the en-
try points of sensitive user data to the application, as well
as which processes and hosts should be allowed to have
access to this data. For instance, after users input their
credit card information through the e-store front end, it
should only be accessed by the e-store’s processes, e.g.,
its web and database servers. The only external chan-
nel through which it can be legitimately transmitted, is
through a connection to the third-party payment proces-
sor, i.e., a well-known remote server address, which can
be included in a white-list describing what sensitive data
from the data flow domain of the application is allowed
to be sent there.
The application we chose for this scenario is Virtue-
Mart [1]. VirtueMart is an open source e-commerce
framework developed as a Joomla component, and is
typically used in PHP/MySQL environments, as both
VirtueMart and Joomla are written in PHP. We config-
ured VirtueMart to accept payments only through credit
card, and set up electronic payments through the Autho-
rize.Net payment gateway service, using a test account.
To incorporate CloudFence, we had to add just a few
lines of code in the registration and checkout phases.
More precisely, we added a new input field in the reg-
istration form for the user’s UUAID, a new column in
the user’s database table and a few lines of code to store
it in the database, along with the user’s info. As for
the checkout phase, we added a few lines of code in the
script that processes the payment information. First, the
UUAID is queried from the database, using the user ID
from the current session. Then the HTTP POST variable
that holds the credit card number is tagged by calling the
add tag API, through a PHP wrapper function. It is im-
portant to tag this variable as soon as possible, so as to
avoid the leakage of untagged copies.
Finally, the data flow domain of the application is the
web server process, the database server process and any
processes these two may spawn.
5.1.2 Backup service
The second case study is on hosting a backup service
on the cloud, using the Amanda network backup [38, 2].
Amanda is a highly configurable backup software, writ-
ten in C and Perl, which offers a wide range of authenti-
cation mechanisms, like ssh, rhosts, kerberos, etc. and a
number of different storage back-ends, such as file sys-
tem, tape devices, Amazon S3, etc. CloudFence’s audit
capability provides a way for the users to attest the cor-
rect use of their backup data. Users know when their
backup client sends data (either because it happens in a
fixed schedule, or because their client keeps a log) and
when it requests data, a recovery is performed manually.
By combining this information with the audit trails pro-
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vided by CloudFence, a user can pick up unauthorized
accesses.
While keeping mostly the default configuration val-
ues, we set up a server and three clients. The server was
configured to store the backup data on the file system
and authentication was performed using the client’s host
name (rhosts). As in the previous case, the application’s
source code had to be changed to incorporate Cloud-
Fence. Assuming that such a system is manually config-
ured, the only change was to retrieve the user’s UUAID
from a host name to UUAID map and tag his data when-
ever a SENDBACKUP command is received. Once tagged,
data carry their label through the different components of
Amanda (taper, dumper, chunker, etc.) until stored in
the file system.
Although the configuration used above fits better to a
scenario where a small or medium business outsources
its backup service, this is not a limitation. The backup
service can also be configured for public use, like Drop-
Box. The only differences in adopting CloudFence in
that case, would be to modify the registration phase to
include the user’s UUAID and the storage of that key.
5.1.3 Bookmark Synchronization
The last use case stems from the ever higher demand for
personal data – photos, emails, bookmarks, etc.– syn-
chronization services, since many users have more than
one personal electronic devices, such as laptop, smart-
phone, tablet, etc. The scenario in this case is to host
a bookmark synchronization service on the cloud. Site-
Bar [3] is an online bookmark manager written in PHP,
which integrates with many modern browsers. When
adding a link to SiteBar, users have the option to set its
access level, public or private – the access level can be
later edited. As a developer, we want to tag only the pri-
vate links as sensitive.
The task of incorporating CloudFence in SiteBar was
very similar with the first case, as both applications are
written in PHP and use MySQL as a database back-end.
Especially for the registration phase, the changes where
almost identical. On the other hand, changing the source
code to tag the sensitive data – private links – was a little
bit more elaborate, because the sensitivity level of data
dynamically changes. Thus, we need to change the code
that adds a link and tag it if it is private. In addition,
we need to change the code that edits a link. If the ac-
cess level changes from private to public, we load the
link, remove its tag using del tag and store it again in
the database. Otherwise, we repeat the same steps, but
instead of removing the tag, we add it using add tag. It
is essential to update the copy in the database on edit, in
order for the change to be persistent.
5.2 Effectiveness
To evaluate the effectiveness of CloudFence, we tested
whether it is able to audit illegitimate tagged data ac-
cesses, performed as a result of an attack. We exploited
two publicly disclosed vulnerabilities of in the studied
applications.
The first vulnerability allows authenticated users of
SiteBar versions earlier than v3.3.8 to read arbitrary files
(CVE-2007-5694). This is the result of insufficiently
checking a user-supplied value through the dir argu-
ment, which was used as the base directory for reading
language specific files, as shown in the snippet below.
sprintf($dir.’/locale/%s/%s’,$var1,$var2);
Passing a file name ending with the URL-encoded
value for the zero byte (%00) causes the open system call




We installed SiteBar version 3.3.8 on top of PHP ver-
sion 5.2.3. Then, we repeatedly read files by exploit-
ing this bug through a web browser in a remote machine.
CloudFence was able to report all accesses to data with
persistent tags in the filesystem.
Another type of attack that usually leads to informa-
tion leakage is SQL injection. Passing special crafted
values which are used by applications to compose SQL
queries can lead to arbitrary SQL command execution.
The main cause, again, is the insufficient checking of
user input values. To demonstrate the effectiveness of
CloudFence on auditing (or even preventing) this type
of attacks, we used a real-world vulnerability found in
VirtueMart version 1.1.4 [4].
The value of the HTTP GET parameter
order status id was not properly sanitized, thus
allowing malicious users to change the SQL SELECT
query by using a URL like the one below.
http://VM_APP/index.php?option=com_virtuemart
&page=order.order_status_form
&order_status_id=-1’ UNION ALL SELECT ...
FROM jos_vm_order_payment where order_id=’5
Which results in the execution of the following query:
SELECT * FROM jos_vm_order WHERE
order_status_id=-1’ UNION ALL SELECT ...
FROM jos_vm_order_payment where order_id=’5’;
The later SQL query returns a row from the
jos vm order payment table, where the credit card
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Figure 5: Requests Throughput for VirtueMart installed
on a Debian 6, with the web server configured to spawn
100 pre-forked processes.
Similarly, we installed the vulnerable version 1.1.4 of
VirtueMart on top of PHP 5.3.3, and tried to steal any
stored credit card numbers by exploiting this bug. In
all cases, CloudFence identified their exfiltration, as they
were tagged as sensitive data upon entry.
5.3 Performance
The last aspect we explored is the performance overhead
imposed by CloudFence’s fine-grained data flow tracking
subsystem, which is a CPU-intensive process due to the
use of dynamic binary instrumentation. Our choices for
the experimental setup mostly focused on deriving a con-
figuration for a worst case scenario to stress-test our pro-
totype implementation. Among the three applications,
we picked VirtueMart, which is the heaviest in terms of
code base size and computational overhead. Both Virtue-
Mart and Joomla are written in PHP, which, as an inter-
preted language, is a worst case for dynamic binary in-
strumentation frameworks like Pin. The instrumentation
code generated by Pin for PHP’s dynamically generated
code cannot be effectively cached, resulting to poor run-
time performance.
VirtueMart was installed in one of the virtual ma-
chines of our testbed. The exact versions of the soft-
ware packages used were the following: VirtueMart
v1.1.8, Joomla v1.5.22, Apache v2.2.16, PHP v5.3.3,
and MySQL v5.1.49. To generate a realistic and inten-
sive workload, we used a second host connected through
a Gigabit switch that emulated typical client requests for
placing product purchases. The Gigabit network connec-
tion minimizes network latency, increasing this way the
stress that we can impose on the server when concur-
rently emulating multiple user transactions.
Instead of performing the same request over and over,
we tried to generate more realistic conditions by replay-
ing complete purchase transactions. Each transaction
consists of nine requests: retrieve the front page, login,
navigate to the product page for a specific item, add that
item in the shopping cart, verify the contents of the shop-
ping cart, checkout, enter payment info, confirm the pur-
chase, and logout. In addition, in each of these requests,
the web clients also download any external resources,
such as images, scripts, and style files, emulating the be-
havior of a real browser, without performing any client-
side caching. We should stress that VirtueMart was fully
configured as in a real production setting, including prop-
erly working integration with Authorize.Net for process-
ing credit card payments using a test account.
Using the above setup, we measured the sustained
throughput of user requests that the server could handle
when processing concurrent transactions from multiple
users. As mentioned in Section 3.3.2, Pin performs a
slow start when it initially instruments most of the startup
code of a process. Instrumented code is then cached,
so subsequent executions of the same code blocks are
much faster. To prevent Pin’s slow start from skewing
our results, we “warmed-up” the Apache and MySQL
processes by performing a single request to each Apache
process. To ensure that each of the warm-up requests is
served by a different process in the process pool, we first
simultaneously initiate one connection per process, and
after all connections have been established, we proceed
and send the actual request data.
Figure 4 shows the sustained request throughput of
the application for a varying number of concurrent web
clients, when VirtueMart is running with and without
CloudFence. The request throughput was calculated by
dividing the number of requests with the total duration
of each experiment. In all runs, each client was config-
ured to perform three end-to-end transactions, so that the
number of requests per client remains consistent across
all experiments. In this experiment, CloudFence imposes
a slowdown of 60%, which is indicative for applications
running on top of dynamic binary instrumentation frame-
works.
We should note that the server throughput in the na-
tive case is not bounded due to limited computation re-
11
sources, but rather due to the default configuration of
Apache, which uses a pool of 10 processes for serving
concurrent clients. Thus, to be more precise, CloudFence
took advantage of the available cycles and imposed an
additional overhead of 60%.
Figure 5 shows the results of the same experiment, but
in this case the process pool size of Apache has been
increase to 100 processes. In this case, the throughput in
the native case is also bounded due to CPU saturation.
In the worst case, CloudFence imposes a slowdown of
90% when the number of concurrent users lies between
80–100 users.
Based on these results, in a real deployment of this ap-
plication, enabling CloudFence would require a twoflod
to tenfold increase of the cloud infrastructure resources
devoted to the application. However, we should note that
the increased overhead of dynamic binary instrumenta-
tion due to the dynamically generated PHP code can be
effectively mitigated using PHP acceleration techniques
based on bytecode caching [37]. These techniques have
become mandatory for high-traffic web sites that use in-
terpreted languages. As part of our future work, we plan
to investigate the performance overhead of CloudFence
under high-end configurations that use bytecode caching.
6 Discussion
The DFT component of CloudFence takes into consider-
ation only cases of explicit data flow, which is in accor-
dance with previous work on the subject [31, 40]. Dytan
made some provisions for conditionally handling implicit
data flows that result from control-flow dependencies,
but concluded that while it can be useful in certain do-
mains, it frequently leads to an explosion in the amount
of tagged data and to incorrect data dependencies [12].
Despite the fact that ongoing work attempts to address
these issues [22], we opted for a design that has zero false
positives and tagging pollution. This choice, however,
can lead into unintended data whitewashing, whenever
the service provider uses a code construct that copies sen-
sitive data using branch statements—which could poten-
tially lead to false negatives.
As an example, consider this code snippet: if (in
== 1) out = 1. Although the value of in is copied to
out, any tags associated with it are not. During our eval-
uation, we manually identified a couple of such cases, in
AES encryption (used in SSL, MySQL and the Suhosin
PHP hardening extension) and Base64 encoding. These
cases were easily handled by hooking the correspond-
ing functions and copying the tag information from their
source to the target operand using the copy tag func-
tion. For example, after encryption using AES, we copy
the plaintext tags over those of the ciphertext. Cipher-
text carries them until decrypted, when we again copy
ciphertext’s tags over plaintext’s. At the end, the de-
crypted buffer has the initial tags. The same also holds
for Base64 encoding.
Currently, the underlying DFT framework that we use
in CloudFence imposes some limitations on the number
of different labels that can be associated with each byte
of sensitive data. Recall that libdft keeps a shadow byte
of tag information, and hence, there is an upper bound
on the number of different labels that can exist within the
boundary of a single process. We plan to further explore
in the future the different tradeoffs between larger tags
and performance overhead.
7 Related Work
A common approach for degrading the impact of data
leaks is to ensure that important data are always stored in
an encrypted form on the remote server [8, 44, 18]. Even
though encryption can help with the problem of secure
storage in the cloud, it does not solve the security issues
of remote data processing in cloud applications. Data
must be decrypted before being processed, and then re-
encrypted, which is a costly process. Added to the inher-
ent latency of the cloud, this can affect endpoint perfor-
mance. In addition, encryption seems to limit data use,
and in particular searching and indexing becomes prob-
lematic. Using a homomorphic encryption scheme [20],
it is possible to perform certain operations directly on the
encrypted data. However, its computation cost is for now
prohibitive for real-world applications.
Information flow tracking is another approach for pro-
tecting against information leakage. While there is a
large body of research focusing on information leakage
prevention within a process [12, 31, 34, 51] or a single
host [14, 32, 46], it was not until recently that interest
has risen for efficient cross-host taint propagation sys-
tems [25, 15, 50, 6, 17]. Most of these techniques are
more problem-specific, and therefore it would be diffi-
cult to adapt them for use in other contexts. For instance,
DBTaint [15] is targeting taint information flow track-
ing specifically for databases. System tomography [29],
which also looks into the concept of propagating taint
information remotely, builds on the QEMU emulator,
which incurs a prohibitively large runtime overhead. Fi-
nally, Neon [50] also requires modifications in the under-
lying system to perform dynamic taint tracking. It uses a
modified NFS server for handling the initial tainting, and
utilizes a network-filter for monitoring the tainted pack-
ets to and from the server.
Jif [33] is an extension of Java for information flow
control. Labels are attached to variables when they are
declared.Consumers voluntarily provide their personal
information to a web site, and decide on restrictions on
usage and recipients. Apart from the systemic limitations
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of labeling and debugging the stronger limitations in its
use are coming from the overly burdensome complexity
of programming in Jif. Another work with similar mo-
tivation is the Resin [47] language runtime for PHP and
Python, that supports policy objects, code that can be at-
tached to objects, and propagates them along with the
data. When the data reaches the system I/O boundaries,
the attached policy object is evaluated automatically and
it either verifies or rejects the flow.
HiStar [48] is an OS that also uses labels to provide
information flow control for sensitive data. Apart from
requiring a lot of effort to be applied to current sys-
tems, it can perform information flow control on sensi-
tive data only if all processes are running on the same
machine. DStar [49] overcomes this limitation by includ-
ing a network protocol and framework that leverages OS-
level protection on individual machines running Histar,
to provide information flow control in distributed sys-
tems. DStar though, in contrast with CloudFence, can
apply policies only at the more coarse-grained level of
files and threads.
When focusing on the problem of data leakage for
cloud-based services, most works reflect continuations
of established lines of security research, such as web se-
curity and secure data outsourcing and assurance, rather
than approaches with an exclusive focus on cloud secu-
rity, with a few exceptions. Ristenpart et al. [35] investi-
gated the security issues of existing deployed cloud sys-
tems, and identified a new class of vulnerabilities that
can lead to cross-VM side-channel attacks.
Mundada et al. [27] presented Silverline, a system that
allows cloud providers to offer data and network isola-
tion for cloud-based services, with the goal to audit and
prevent data leaks resulting from misconfigurations and
side-channel attacks from co-resident cloud tenants. Al-
though the concept of Silverline is close to CloudFence,
Silverline supports information flow tracking using per-
process labeling, requiring one process per user, which is
not usually the case in most common web-applications.
In contrast, CloudFence is based on fine-grained byte-
level labeling and can handle multiple users per process.
Vanish [19] follows a different approach to informa-
tion leakage prevention. It seeks to protect the privacy
of past, archived data against accidental or malicious at-
tacks by providing users with control over the lifetime of
their private files. The idea is to ensure that all copies of
sensitive data become unreadable after a user-specified
time, without the need of any trusted third party for per-
forming the deletion. Vanish meets this challenge by in-
tegrating cryptographic techniques with distributed sys-
tems.
Brown et al. [9] tried to address the problem of
trustworthy cloud-hosted services even when the ser-
vice provider is not trusted, by involving a trusted cloud
provider attesting service application code to end-users.
Like CloudFence, this work also tries to give insights to
the end-users regarding the processing of their sensitive
data by the cloud-hosted services, but the focus in this
one is on code attestation and the main assumption is of
a service provider as a PaaS client of the cloud, whereas
CloudFence can be employed in all models of cloud ser-
vices. Santos et al. [36] also worked on the issue of a
trusted cloud computing platform (TCCP) but their ap-
proach was based on TPM attestation chains.
8 Conclusion
One of the most highly cited concerns regarding cloud-
hosted third-party services is the fear of unauthorized ex-
posure of users sensitive data. In lack of a better alterna-
tive option, the end users have to trust both the third-
party service provider’s as well as the cloud infrastruc-
ture provider’s best efforts to properly handle their sen-
sitive data as authorized.
This work takes a step further towards addressing this
issue by introducing a new direct relationship between
the users of the third-party online services and the cloud
infrastructure provider. CloudFence is a service provided
by the cloud infrastructure to both service providers and
end-users, aiming to reinforce the users’ confidence for
their cloud-resident data.
Our evaluation using real-world applications shows
that CloudFence can be integrated easily, even within ex-
isting applications, can protect against information dis-
closure attacks, and it imposes a modest performance
overhead that allows its practical use in real environ-
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